Delayed second dose compared to the normal treatment for vaccination against Covid-19

Recommend that you follow the standard regimen

Nicole Lurie, Managing Director, MSPH

Public health leaders need to make the best decisions they can with the available science, and the balance between population health, social and economic concerns, and the need to maintain public confidence. Decision-making data is rarely available when needed, but the “retrospect-o-scope” is always ready to evaluate decisions made. US science agencies (the National Institutes of Health, the FDA and the CDC) as well as vaccine developers are committed to making Covid-19 vaccine recommendations guided by science.

My recommendation is that at the moment in the United States we should not delay the second dose of mRNA vaccine after the intervals evaluated for their emergency authorization. Although the immune response to the first dose is unlikely to decrease rapidly, it is incomplete, and there are no data to indicate how long a second dose can be delayed without compromising effectiveness. We do not even know the duration of the immunity produced by the two-dose regimen, or how the dose timing affects the immunity in elderly and immunocompromised persons responsible for most hospitalizations and deaths. If a second dose is significantly delayed, these people may simultaneously be inadequately protected and impede progress in alleviating the increase in hospitalizations.

Populations that are essential for social and economic functioning, such as frontline health care workers and other essential workers, must have the assurance that if they are vaccinated, they can expect a high level of protection and work more safely. The delay of a second dose may not provide the insurance and may have an adverse effect on their future willingness to work or to be vaccinated.

Some models have suggested that the use of a less effective vaccine or the postponement of a second dose to give the first doses to more people will end the pandemic sooner.10.11 However, these models do not take into account the possible deterioration of the immune response or the effect of such decisions on the acceptance of vaccines. Many people are skeptical about vaccines, fearing that the speed of development will need to turn around and that political pressure has influenced vaccine recommendations. Suddenly, the dosing recommendations change the public’s confidence in serious dangers and hamper willingness to be vaccinated. Cases of Covid-19 have already occurred in vaccine recipients, as seen in phase 3 trials, which will raise questions about the strategy for the delayed second dose and will erode confidence in the explosion of the vaccine. If these breakthrough cases occur more frequently before the second, delayed dose, confidence will be further impaired, which will eventually delay the end of the pandemic and social and economic recovery.

The presence of SARS-CoV-2 variants implies that the virus is under evolutionary pressure. Some have postulated – though speculatively – that the inhibitory levels of antibody response before a second dose, if widespread, may contribute to the choice of antigenic variants that may escape current vaccines.12 Although we now know how to make Covid-19 vaccines, the design, testing, manufacture and administration of a vaccine at a new variant will take time and it will be challenging.

At present our country is not able to administer the doses it has quickly. The supply constraints are likely to ease within a month or two, as manufacturing becomes more efficient and other vaccines are likely to be available. Meanwhile, vaccines are not the only tool to destroy this pandemic. In the short term, adherence to basic public health measures is expected to save 1.5 times as many lives as vaccines.13 As we increase vaccination, I would strongly encourage us to use science to quickly evaluate alternative approaches to expanding vaccine supply (e.g. delayed second dose, half dose and use of dose saver aids) to raise critical questions answer. for now and in anticipation of new, vaccine-resistant strains.

Disclosure forms provided by the author are available in full text of this article on NEJM.org.

Dr. Lurie is a strategic advisor at the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). The views expressed do not represent those of CEPI.

This article was published on February 17, 2021 on NEJM.org.

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From the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, Oslo.

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