Top findings from the Inspector General’s Capitol Riot Report

A new report by the Capitol Police’s internal watchdog found that departmental leaders had missed important intelligence in the run-up to the January 6 riots, including a warning that ‘Congress itself is the target’, and the unit’s riot response unit prohibits its most powerful crowd control measures

The 104-page document, entitled “Review of the Events Surrounding the Jan. 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol,” is the most moving portrait yet of the decay and calculations surrounding the most violent attack on the Capitol in two centuries. It adds important new details that were not discovered in the congressional hearings and is likely to inform an upcoming overhaul of the agency promised by lawmakers.

Capitol Police Inspector General Michael A. Bolton described the report as “sensitive to law enforcement” and did not disclose it to the public. But The New York Times checked a copy before his testimony to the House Administration Committee, which was scheduled for Thursday.

Here are the highlights.

The department’s own intelligence unit, which monitors possible threats, warned three days before the riot that supporters of President Donald J. Trump, motivated by his false election fraud, could target Congress and become violent.

“Unlike previous protests, the targets of Trump supporters are not necessarily the opponents as before, but Congress itself is the target on the 6th,” a January 3 threat assessment said. Stopping the tendency of the steal to attract white supremacists, civilian members and others who actively promote violence can lead to a significant dangerous situation for law enforcement and the general public. ”

The unit was not alone in sounding the alarm. Separately, the Department of Homeland Security warned the agency that it had found a map of the tunnel system of the Capitol complex posted on pro-Trump message boards. And the FBI’s field office in Norfolk also expressed concern on January 5th.

But Mr. Bolton noted that when an operation plan was written two days later, leaders included that “no specific threats were known related to the joint sitting of Congress.” His report blames dysfunction within Capitol police for the failure.

Divisional leaders defended their actions and dismissed the intelligence reports in public testimony. “None of the information we received predicted what actually happened,” Steven A. Sund, the former chief of police in the Capitol, told the Senate in February. “These criminals were prepared for war.”

The report contains a collection of issues related to the Civil Unrest Unit, a group of officers containing large crowds and protests. These shortcomings hampered Capitol police’s ability to respond when hundreds of rioters arrived.

The unit, Mr. Bolton wrote, was ‘working at a lower level of readiness due to a lack of equipment standards’ and promoting a ‘culture’ that reduces ‘operational readiness’.

The problems were exacerbated when the department’s leadership instructed the unit not to use some of its most powerful crowd control tools – such as stun grenades. broke into the building.

“Heavier less lethal weapons”, said Mr. Bolton wrote, “was not used that day due to leadership orders.”

Elsewhere in the report, the inspector general found that officers responding on January 6 were equipped with protective shields stored in a trailer without climate control and ‘crushed to an impact’.

In another case, officers could sneak in for something to protect them, not use their shields during the siege because they were locked in a bus.

“When the crowd became riotous, the CDU platoon tried to gain access to the bus to disperse the shields, but could not because the door was locked,” the report reads. As a result, the platoon had to ‘respond to the crowd without protecting their riot shields’.

The report also found that some ammunition in the department’s armor had expired.

Luke Broadwater contribution made.

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