National overview
How China crushed Hong Kong’s democracy
On March 11, an annual assembly of functionaries planned a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with the rubber stamp to suppress most of the rest of Hong Kong’s democratic processes. At the “Two Sessions” meeting, or Lianghui, more than 5,000 members of the CCP elite – members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the National People’s Conference – made the “decision to improve the electoral system of the HKSAR “adopted by a vote of 2895–0, with one abstention. Party officials welcomed the emergence of “a new democratic system with Hong Kong characteristics”, an easy denial of Hong Kong’s proud tradition of limited but vibrant democracy. Indeed, what is coming is an electoral system in Hong Kong with features of the Chinese Communist Party. The changes approved during the “two sessions” will restructure the Electoral Commission (EAC) in Hong Kong in such a way as to strengthen the CCP’s control over electoral processes. In addition to the election of the CEO, the EAC will now elect a larger proportion of the members of the Legislative Council and participate directly in the nomination of all candidates to the body. The strongest change is to introduce a pro-Beijing litmus test for candidates: from now on, their “patriotism” must now be determined. Lo Kin-hei, chairman of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, calls it ‘the biggest regression of the system since the handover’. Xi Jinping’s motives behind the idea that ‘patriots rule in Hong Kong’ are obvious. He and other CCP leaders believe that the Hong Kong authorities have been too tolerant of the democratic opposition for the past twenty years, giving Hong Kongers the impression that they can wrestle with the central government, which they say will not dare to take the table. not. them because of the interests of the so-called foreign powers in Hong Kong. The central government has tried to make Hong Kong a positive example of ‘one country, two systems’ to appeal to Taiwan. But while the model found no acceptance in Taiwan, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen used it to make waves in Hong Kong himself. As Taiwan made it clear that peaceful reunification was not possible, Hong Kong’s role as a model became meaningless and the Chinese central government gradually began to address the problems left behind by policy errors in the reformulation of a new program. for Taiwan. . As a new US government has little desire to soften the tighter stance toward China imposed by President Trump, relations between China and the United States have deteriorated to the worst level since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. So patience has lost its rationale. In light of this, it is not surprising that the US has condemned the changes to Hong Kong’s internal government. But other Western governments have joined the US in their condemnations. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken tweeted that the changes were “contrary to the international obligations of the People’s Republic of China” and that we stand with allies and partners for the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong. In a review of the political conditions in Hong Kong, the European Union described a “worrying political decline” and a “severe erosion of autonomy, democracy and fundamental freedoms”, which promised an unknown “further steps”. The Group of Seven (G7) countries expressed ‘serious concern’ about the plan and boldly predicted that it would ‘stifle political pluralism’. A statement from the Foreign Secretary’s Office said that the United Kingdom would now consider China in a state of continued non-compliance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which was intended to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy and rule of law. until 2047 to guarantee. “China must act in accordance with its legal obligations and respect fundamental rights and freedoms in Hong Kong,” said Dominic Raab, the British foreign secretary, but Beijing simply shrugged off the order, saying Hong Kong’s electoral system was China’s internal affair. Insofar as the CCP addresses critics of its changes to the Hong Kong government, it does so in a manner consistent with its preference for defensive victim narratives, claiming that these changes were imposed on the regime by external and internal threats. the National People’s Congress meeting, Wang Chen, vice president of the body, explained that since the ‘anti-extradition legislative movement’ in Hong Kong in 2019, anti-China forces and local radical separatist forces have openly advocated for ‘Hong Kong independence ”and other ideas against the CCP using election platforms on both the Legislative Council and the District Council ade. Wang warned that Democrats were trying (sniff!) To take control of the Legislative Council through elections and seize the right to govern Hong Kong. He claims that ‘foreign powers’ have openly interfered in Hong Kong’s affairs through consular offices, NGOs and other channels, and that the US has even imposed harsh ‘sanctions’ on Chinese officials, blatantly supporting ‘anti-China’ and protecting them. granted it. powers ”in Hong Kong. To further de-legitimize democratic political actors and view them as threats, the amendments suggest that additional mass arrests of pro-democracy and independence activists who are believed to be ‘anti-China and anti-Hong Kong’ are coming. Following the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law in July last year, there was debate among the CCP elite over whether Beijing would immediately deal with the democratic opposition in Hong Kong or impose a tactical delay. Some believed that Beijing, given the possible strong backlash against the law and the widespread opposition from Western countries, should evaluate the effectiveness of the law over a period of time before deciding on the next step, as long as the opposition in Hong Could do it. do not cause problems and boycott the Hong Kong government and the central government. These relative moderates thought the majority of the opposition figures should be spared, except for a handful of black hands and heads as a warning to others. But others believed the protests against the extradition in Hong Kong had shocked Beijing too much, and since Xi Jinping had already enacted the national security law against Hong Kong, he should liquidate democratic activists one by one. Now it is clear that Xi Jinping has chosen the second option. Shortly after the promulgation of the National Security Act, Beijing launched a fierce “counter-offensive” against the democratic opposition in Hong Kong. Those who were active in the protests were always sought by the Hong Kong government (unless they fled to Taiwan or the West). On the eve of the two sessions, courts in Hong Kong filed charges and arrested 47 people in what Beijing called the “anti-China and ruin – Hong Kong 47-people rebellion case”, the largest trial in the eight months since the implementation of the National Security Act. After the law was enacted, Xi’s next step towards democratic democracy in Hong Kong finally made the overhaul of Hong Kong’s electoral mechanism. State-oriented Chinese scholars have publicly claimed that executive power will be firmly in the hands of ‘patriots’, who will effectively exclude ‘anti-China’ forces from entering the government structure. The space for ‘street politics – demonstration and campaign’ to enter the political stage will be limited or even eliminated. Xi’s step-by-step approach to the subjugation of Hong Kong suggests that efforts to further purify Hong Kong’s so – called independence factor and impose ‘patriotic’ frameworks in the education, media and local community sectors will be forthcoming. His last step would be to demand of this new ‘patriotic’ government in Hong Kong to build political support, that is, to buy, by reducing the wealth disparities and reducing employment and housing opportunities for the younger generation. It is unlikely that Beijing will publicly announce the abolition of the outdated ‘one country, two systems’ model, and it will retain it even after the 50-year transition period has expired. However, the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Act and the overhaul of the electoral system have thwarted it. Economic integration with the continent and the full political implementation of ‘Hong Kong-dominated patriots’ means that there is no difference between Hong Kong and its counterparts in Shenzhen or Shanghai. Beijing does not care if Hong Kong is a special trade area or not. Independent of verbal assaults from the West, the CCP is confident in its power to deal with foreign capitalists and influence policymakers in the West. Its leaders believe they have done so successfully in the three decades following the 1989 Tiananmen incident, not only out of an unprecedented political crisis, locally and internationally, but also as a global economic leader. It is unclear how international capital will respond to Beijing’s economic policies in Hong Kong, and how capital will affect Western Hong Kong politics. What is clear is that the central government will never stop before the British and American legacy is eradicated in Hong Kong. The gloomy situation presents an unprecedented challenge to the democratic movement in Hong Kong, as well as to the members of the international community who believe that all people deserve political freedom. Jianli Yang is the founder and president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China. Aaron Rhodes is the human rights editor of Dissident magazine and the president of the Forum for Religious Freedom Europe.