Eventually, Stadia Games and Entertainment teams got the software and the people who needed it to get prototypes of Stadia games. The allure of a Google-sized salary and a hamster-wheeled drive-off exit was enough to lure a critical mass of developers to Stadia Games and Entertainment. Artists, manufacturers, sound experts, programmers were encouraged by the promise of making unique games for a revolutionary software – and according to many people, without the threat of layoffs like the sword of Damocles, as is often the case with traditional gaming companies. Teams investigated how Google games could look like, how to make the best use of the power of Google’s massive data centers and the display of cloud games. Then Covid-19 struck.
In April 2020 – a month after the Los Angeles studio was announced – Google implemented a lease term. “It’s time to significantly slow down the pace of hiring,” Pichai said in an internal message, “while maintaining momentum in a small number of strategic areas where users and businesses rely on Google for ongoing support, and where our growth is critical to their success. ”According to four sources, gambling was not one of the ‘strategic areas’.
“If the company approves it, it enables us to impair our ability to build content,” says one source. ‘The studio was not yet fully formed and ready to produce games. It braked and was a statement. We interpreted this as a lack of commitment on the part of Google to create content. ”
Google is not the first technology giant to experience these problems. Amazon followed a similar arc. In 2020, WIRED investigated the enormous challenges that Jeff Bezos’ empire faced before producing first-party games in its Amazon Game Studios. Like Google, Amazon has hired the best of the best: trusted developers like Far Cry 2see Clint Hocking, System Cook 2see Ian Vogel, EverQuestsee John Smedley, en Hall‘s Kim Swift, who was very excited about the stability and relatively higher salaries associated with the technology giant. According to various sources, Amazon’s goal was to make a billion-dollar franchise that would help advertise the company’s cloud technology, own game engine, and Twitch streaming service.
The approach, according to sources, was hubristic. Amazon wanted to ‘win at games’ and develop multiple AAA games at once, despite its unsuitable track record in the industry. Mike Frazzini, head of Amazon Game Studios, has no professional gaming experience. High expectations combined with Amazon peculiarities – for example, an obsession with internal software and a solution for measuring success with data – have led to failure after failure. Amazon has canceled at least three of its games: Project Nova, Break away, en Furnaceof which the last was canceled only five months after release.
AAA game development can cost between $ 100 million and $ 200 million. Successes like Blizzard’s Ear Watch comes from the ashes of failures, such as the deleted massive multiplayer online role-playing game Titan. Product design at large technology companies may not always be simple, but game design is a resource- and money-intensive maze.
“I think it’s a lack of understanding of the process,” says one source who works at Stadia. “People at the executive level did not seem to fully understand how to work through a space that is very creative, cross-disciplinary.”
During Google’s rental period, game developers felt they were reaching their goals. Prototypes were developed without full resources; the studios are not working at full capacity. When it came time for performance review, Google rated three game developers according to criteria created for UX or visual designers. There is no number associated with ‘fun-to-play’, or a process-based workflow to generate creativity. Veteran game developers have worked as hard as possible for their work culture. Over time, Google seemed to soften. Developers were given the necessary tools, the appropriate appraisal processes. But not the number of people. Frustration continued.