The IDF knows almost everything about Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, but could still be punished by an unwanted escalation with him, the former IDF intelligence chief, Brig.Gen. (Ret.), Itai Brun, said. The Jerusalem Post Monday.
“The IDF knows a lot about Nasrallah. “Nasrallah knows this and knows a lot about Israel, but there can still be an escalation that is different from the way he usually behaves,” Brun said, referring to the idea that leaders can act unpredictably, even after a period in which they follow a consistent pattern. .
He said the message of the IDF intelligence through the article appeared to be: ‘We know everything – you are exposed. Your organization is exposed. We have superior information. ”
Furthermore, Brun, who is currently deputy director for research and analysis at INSS, said IDF information could use the article to respond in this latest series of exchanges.
Describe how in January Chief of Staff of the IDF, Lt.Gen. Aviv Kochavi threatened Nasrallah to try to stop him from any escalation, and the Hezbollah chief’s counter-threat that he had surprises for Jerusalem in the event of war that could shock Israelis, Brun said, could be the IDF’s response: “You can not surprise us. ”
The article describes Nasrallah as obsessed with reading Israeli media coverage, with his image in Israel and in Lebanon in general, and with maintaining extraordinary levels of micromanagement and control over the Lebanese state.
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In addition, the IDF intelligence officials in the article give the impression that they have tremendous penetration and insight into Nasrallah’s inner circle, way of working and intentions.
To that extent, intelligence officials suggest that Nasrallah is much more intimidated and intimidated about any broad-based conflict with Israel and much more conservative about ventures than he was earlier in his 28-year rule over the Lebanese terrorist group.
Brun, who probably formulated significant portions of the classified file during his service, confirmed that Nasrallah ‘is very interested in the Israeli public, the government, the IDF and what they say about him’, as well as his’ obsessive reading of everything that we write and stories about him having Israeli newspapers near him. ”
However, he said: “Nasrallah’s most important knowledge comes not from reading, but from the Hezbollah conflict over 28 years.”
At this point, Brun points to gaps in Nasrallah’s knowledge and where Israeli estimates may also be unclear despite impressive penetration of intelligence.
After conflict with Israel in 1993, 1996, 2000, an exchange of attacks in 2003 and a kidnapping attack in late 2005, the Hezbollah chief thought he could continue small kidnapping attacks without risking a major battle with Jerusalem.
Brun said Nasrallah “was really surprised he did not understand the Israeli side” which led to the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and others replaced Ariel Sharon and those who had ruled the country for about five years. managed.
In other words, Nasrallah did not plan for the Great War in 2006, and that war, coupled with its success in transforming Hezbollah’s military force into more of an army, a social network, and a dominant political apparatus, his attitude towards Israel changed.
The former top military intelligence official said he was calling the current version of Nasrallah “Nasrallah 4.0”.
Similar to current IDF officials quoted in the Yediot article, he said the Hezbollah leader is now a “proponent of the status quo. He designed the rules of the game. [in Lebanon], so now he does not want to break the rules. ”
He added Nasrallah “has turned into a more cautious, cautious and determined actor” before taking significant steps across Israel.
In addition, Brun confirmed that Nasrallah was ‘overworked and thinly spread’ to try to deal with all the various power levers after his main military planner, Imad Mughniyeh, was assassinated in 2008, according to reports by Israel and the US.
Another important evolution he discussed was that Hezbollah now ‘mostly serves the interests of the organization, thinks of its own people and institutions’, instead of being ‘only a proxy for Iran’.
All this maintenance of the pillars of his power and success in Lebanon are the same reasons why the ‘current description of the IDF information is correct – today he is more hesitant, less willing to take risks, more subdued.’
But Brun marked Nasrallah’s attack on an IDF convoy in the North in September 2019 when he did not know Israeli soldiers would avoid being killed, as a sign that he was ready for an escalation if it is important enough, though perhaps not for an escalation out of control. ”
According to the former senior intelligence official, this means that the IDF cannot be complacent and feel safe that there is no scenario where Hezbollah will not flood Israel with its arsenal of rockets.
He argued that a deep understanding of a leader’s habits in the past is good, but that it is only their habits in the past and is not a perfect indication of their future behavior.
“I do not think it is right to learn from this that we know exactly what Nasrallah is going to do … leaders do not have operational codes,” which perfectly predicts when they can act against their usual pattern.
Brun cites a series of examples of leaders and countries acting unpredictably, including Anwar Sadat, Mikhail Gorbachev, Barack Obama and Donald Trump.
He said that although he did not necessarily participate in such an article on the sharing of classified intel during his IDF service, that he did attend conferences and that ‘the world has changed. There is logic to doing this with the right caution. So many things are being revealed today. ”