The US campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria often leads to a priority of tactical, close air support operations and bombings as strategic, ‘deep strike’ missions, according to a new report by Rand Corp.
But while the aggressive effort paralyzed some ISIS strongholds, it did little in the long run to accelerate the caliphate’s defeat, the report said.
In ‘The Air War Against the Islamic State: The Roll of Airpower in Operation Inherent Resolve’, researchers conclude that area-limiting operations are seen as the measure of success during the increased effort, which stretched from 2014 to 2019.
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“Deep-strike operations helped stress ISIS’s finances and accelerate their downfall, but were ultimately peripheral to the overall strategy,” according to the study, published Friday. “Because the elimination of ISIS ‘protostat was of paramount importance, territory was the most important measure of success in OIR, which in turn meant that the close struggle was prioritized above the deep struggle.”
The 500-page study uses open source data and reporting as well as interviews with officials.
The conflict was complicated, conducted in two countries with different authorities and rules of engagement for American and coalition partners. As a result, the majority of US military support comes from the air force, the report said.
The report breaks down the attempt into three phases: demolition (2014-’15), counter-attack (2016-’17) and a defeat (2018-’19), and focuses on offensive campaigns devoted to important geographical locations and timelines. It breaks out, for example, how larger B-1B Lancer bomber and fighter jets were devoted to the expulsion of ISIS fighters from Kobani, Syria, during the last four months of 2014.
Attack, fighter jets and bomber jets unleashed a large amount of weapons over a period of six years. Strikes across Iraq and Syria continue to this day.
In a comparison of the U.S.’s leading military interventions in recent decades, the air campaign against ISIS ranks second in Operation Desert Storm of 1990-91 in terms of weapons dropped: 115,983 to 227,000, according to the report, although the anti -ISIS attempt ran much longer.
The study did not look at other regions, such as Libya and Afghanistan, which saw the results of the ISIS fighter groups.
Land Recovery
The report found that the use of air force to support the land forces of local partners was the most important strategy to regain territory, especially during the first two years of the campaign.
“Because the United States wanted a ‘limited liability, limited risk’ approach, which also yielded a lasting outcome, the United States identified Iraqi and Syrian partners for ground forces as the primary endeavor. “‘It meant again [close-air support, or CAS] was prioritized over strategic attack operations. ‘
Rand notes a long-running debate between ground force commanders and air force theorists over the use of CAS versus strategic strikes.
CAS actions, carried out by attack aircraft such as the A-10 warthog, aim to cut off the enemy’s ability to move.
But air force advocates “argue that air forces are most effective when their capabilities are used in strategic attacks against the weight of an enemy – that is, high-value targets that have excessive consequences against an adversary’s military or political will to fights, ‘the report reads, adding that although CAS is essential in any ground-heavy war, its effects are’ localized and tactical. ‘
The researchers point out that CAS alone was not enough.
MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, or ISR, aircraft were required to perform overwatch for ground forces before and during a ground attack. It was also indispensable for deliberate targets, or those that required weeks of investigation and planning. As a result, the drones were transferred too much.
There was also a demand for fuel trucks, which roamed for hours to supply gas to aircraft involved under the forces. “None of these operations would have been possible without tankers complementing a joint and coalition partner aircraft,” the report said.
Slow target approval
Fighter jets such as the F-16 Fighting Falcons and F-15E Strike Eagles were instrumental in the early days of the air campaign and by the end of 2014 had flown a total of 1,784 fights.
Even with the increasing pace of air operations, it was difficult to investigate the effects of air force during the earliest months of the war ‘because of the intelligence problems that hinder the development of deliberate targets’, according to the report. These targets included ISIS safe havens where the group centralized cash reserves and revenue, such as oil facilities.
Critics argue that Operation Inherent Resolve has also been hampered by “an excessive focus on avoiding collateral damage and casualties.” ‘
ISIS fighters realized this and quickly began to change their behavior, making it more difficult for American and coalition forces to distinguish themselves from civilians, according to the report.
Thereafter, the theoretical time lagged behind: U.S. pilots reported that the dynamic target approval process – those not defined during the mission planning stage or sought early – often took more than 30 minutes and sometimes even hours. . ‘before they could strike, the report said.
“Anecdotally, we have often heard that Iraqi ground forces were frustrated by the slow target approval process and wanted the coalition’s airstrikes to be more responsive to their needs,” the researchers said, adding that the views of Iraqi government, Syrian partners and other coalition members “could have been different.”
The airspace over Syria became even more controversial as Russia entered the war zone in 2015, along with drones manufactured by Iran.
The pace accelerated as the authoritative body was delegated to lower ranks. In 2017, then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis blamed President Donald Trump for the decision.
“[Trump] “has delegated the authority at the right level to act aggressively and in a timely manner against hostile vulnerabilities,” Mattis told reporters during a briefing at the time.
Although it was most effective against small, mobile targets, the results reportedly ‘improved battlefield results’.
According to the report, another problem was that pilots were reluctant to engage forces other than ISIS, given the U.S.’s limited intervention strategy, and had to be reminded that they could act in self-defense.
Toe-Lt. General Jeffrey Harrigian, commander of the combined air component, had to “empower pilots and remind them that they are not only supported, but that they must carry out this defense mission.”
In June 2017, a Super Hornet of the F / A-18E carried out the U.S. Army’s first air-to-air killing in a manned aircraft in nearly two decades when it struck a Syrian Su-22 mechanic south of Taqbah made of lace. That same month, F-15Es shot down two armed pro-Syrian regime Shaheed-129 drones.
Lessons for the future
The report recommends that troops acquire ‘weakened’ skills, including coordinated gathering and targeting of intelligence. There were many shortcomings in the deliberate target development process, researchers said, due to a shortage of drones and the lack of guidance through proper command channels.
The researchers found that the combined task force operation Inherent Resolve, the US-led international coalition, did not have enough resources to carry out the tactical battle and the joint targeting process.
“After decades of largely oversaw missions with few but CAS and dynamic targets since September 11, the joint community’s ability and ability to deliberately plan and develop
strike in the deep areas weakened, ”they wrote.
It also had an impact on the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Force Base, Qatar, where airline “had to build a new goal”.
“This has meant that many practitioners have not had the experience to apply these processes to actual surgeries and the ‘muscle memory’ to perform them quickly,” the report said.
The researchers also stressed that pilots take the defensive measures more seriously only after they have been authorized to do so. In order to better prepare airmen for a potential near-peer conflict, they need to “emphasize” self-defense rules of air-to-air operations before the mission begins, they write.
– Oriana Pawlyk can be reached at [email protected]. Follow her on Twitter @ Oriana0214.
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